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ENFORCEMENT OF THE EXCELSIOR RULE
IN THE DISTRICT COURTS
The National Labor Relations Board has been concerned for
many years with the problems created by the inherent advantage enjoyed by employers in gaining access to eligible voters in representation
proceedings. The major difficulty has been that a labor union has no
way to be certain of reaching all the employees with its arguments,
whereas the employer is assured of the continuing opportunity to
inform the entire electorate of his views. As a result, some employees
are often completely unaware of the union's point of view at the time
of the election.
To remedy this situation, the Board, in Excelsior Underwear,
Inc.,' held that in all representation proceedings under the National
Labor Relations Act, the employer must file with the regional director
conducting the election a list containing the names and addresses of
all eligible voters within seven days after the election has been ordered.2
The regional director, in turn, is required to make this information
available to all parties to the proceeding.
Failure to comply with the Excelsior rule-an employer's refusal
to disclose the names and addresses of his employees-is regarded as
tending to interfere with prospects for a fair and free election, and thus
provides a per se ground for setting aside the election.' This sanction,
although achieving compliance with the Excelsior rule in the great
majority of cases, still provides the employer with a "way out." If he
is willing to accept the penalty of having only a union-won election
validated, he can refuse to comply with the rule.
Recently, the NLRB has sought to close this door left open to
the employer by forcing compliance through the courts. Judicial
enforcement has been sought under two theories: (1) that the lists
can be subpoenaed as evidence under section 11 of the National Labor
Relations Act,4 and (2) that an injunction can be obtained from the
federal district court under section 1337 of the Judicial Code.5 Under
these theories the Board has had varying success in securing specific
1156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
2The Board's primary reason for affording union access to a list of names and

addresses was to achieve a more informed electorate. Id. at 1240-42. In addition, the
Board noted that access to such a list would facilitate eligibility checks for the union,
and thereby reduce the number of challenges that the Board would have to resolve.
Id. at 1242-43.
3

Id. at 1240.

429 U.S.C. § 161 (1964).
5 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1964)
(1434)
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performance of its rule.6 For instance, in NLRB v. Hanes Hosiery
Division,7 the Fourth Circuit decided that "fairness in the elective
process demands here . . . the opportunity of contesting parties to
communicate their respective positions to the electorate," 8 and that
relief should be afforded under either section 11 of the NLRA or 28
U.S.C. § 1337. In NLRB v. Rohlen,3 the Seventh Circuit held that
it was proper for the Board to subpoena the list as evidence which would
aid in the determination of "employee group-preference." 10 However,
the court declined to pass on the issue whether the district court had
jurisdiction to enforce compliance with the rule under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1337. Later, the Federal District Court for the District of New
Jersey, in NLRB v. Q-T Shoe Manufacturing Co.,' refused to grant
relief under either theory and held that "enforcement of the Excelsior
rule can only occur after it has been properly determined by the Board
that the refusal by the defendant to provide the Union with a list of
its employees' names and addresses constitutes an unfair labor practice
under Section 8(a) (1) of the Act . ... "

For the purpose of this Comment it will be assumed that the
Excelsior rule itself is valid. 3 The only issue discussed is the propriety of enforcing the rule under either section 11 of the NLRA or
28 U.S.C. § 1337.
s As of July, 1968, eleven courts have passed on actions brought by the Board for
subpoena enforcement or a mandatory injunction in aid of the Excelsior rule. Four
courts have granted relief under both theories. NLRB v. Hanes Hosiery Div., 384
F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 950 (1968) ; Swift & Co. v. Solien,
274 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Mo. 1967); NLRB v. British Auto Parts, Inc., 266 F. Supp.
368 (C.D. Cal. 1967); NLRB v. Wolverine Indus. Div., 54 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 11,658
(E.D. Mich. 1966). Four courts enforced the Board's subpoena but did not pass on the
question whether an injunction could issue. NLRB v. Rohlen, 385 F.2d 52 (7th Cir.
1967); NLRB v. Cone Mills Corp., 58 CCH Lab. Cas. 12,861 (D. S.C. July 17,
1968) ; NLRB v. Teledyne, Inc., 56 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 12,229 (N.D. Cal. Oct 11, 1967) ;
NLRB v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. N.Y. 1967). Two
courts have denied relief under either theory. NLRB v. Q-T Shoe Mfg. Co., 279 F.
Supp. 1 (D. N.J. 1968); NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 54 CCH Lab. Cas.
ff 11,659 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 13, 1967). One circuit court, reversing the district court's
order upholding the Board's subpoena, found that the Excelsior rule itself was invalid
because it was not promulgated in accordance with the notice and publication requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552, 553 (1967). WymanGordon Co. v. NLRB, 58 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 12,750 (1st Cir. June 12, 1968).
7384 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1967).
8 Id.at 191.
)385 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1967).
10 Id.at 57.
11279 F. Supp. 1 (D. N.J. 1968).
12d. at 8.
13 This assumption has been denied recently by the court in Wyman-Gordon
Co. v. NLRB, 58 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 12,750 (1st Cir. June 12, 1968), where it was held
that the Excelsior rule "was promulgated in disregard of the notice and publication
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552, 553 [1967]"
and therefore would not be enforced. Id. at 21,806. This argument has been made to
other courts but has been rejected. NLRB v. Q-T Shoe Mfg. Co., 279 F. Supp. 1, 5
(D. N.J. 1968); NLRB v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 432, 438 (S.D.
N.Y. 1967).
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The Board's Power to Subpoena the Lists of Names and Addresses
Under Section 11 of the National Labor Relations Act
Section 11(2) of the National Labor Relations Act permits the
Board to issue, and the district courts to enforce, subpoenas requiring
a ".

.

. person to appear before the Board, its members, agents, or

agency, there to produce evidence if so ordered, or there to give
testimony touching the matter under investigation or in question." 14
Historically, courts had been slow to recognize the broad power
of administrative agencies to subpoena material. At the beginning of
the century, they applied to administrative agencies the same rules
which had limited their own powers of investigation. For example, in
F.T.C. v. American Tobacco Co., 5 Mr. Justice Holmes condemned
the Federal Trade Commission's attempt to exercise its subpoena powers
on the ground that "fishing expeditions" into private records were
contrary to the fourth amendment. However, as administrative regulation expanded, the need for broad investigatory powers became
apparent. In 1950, in United States v. Morton Salt Co.,' the Court
14 National Labor Relations Act [hereinafter cited as NLRA] § 11, U.S.C. § 161
(1964):
For the purpose of all hearings and investigations which, in the opinion of the
Board, are necessary and proper for the exercise of the powers vested in it by
section 9 and section 10(1) The Board, or its duly authorized agents or agencies, shall at all reasonable times have access to, for the purpose of examination, and the right to
copy any evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded against
that relates to any matter under investigation or in question. The Board,
or any member thereof, shall upon application of any party to such proceedings, forthwith issue to such party subpenas requiring the attendance
and testimony of witnesses or the production of any evidence in such pro-

ceeding or investigation requested in such application . . .

[T]he Board

shall revoke such subpena if in its opinion the evidence whose production
is required does not relate to any matter under investigation, or any matter
in question in such proceedings ....
(2) In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpena issued to any person,
any district court of the United States . . . within the jurisdiction

of which said person guilty of contumacy or refusal to obey is found or
transacts business, upon application by the Board shall have jurisdiction
to issue to such person an order requiring such person to appear before
the Board, its member, agents, or agency, there to produce evidence if so
ordered, or there to give testimony touching the matter under investigation
or in question.
1-5264 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1924) (F.T.C. sought to subpoena records, memoranda
and correspondence. The subpoenas were requested pursuant to a Senate resolution
passed August 9, 1921, directing the Commission to investigate the tobacco industry.)
It should be noted that the subpoena power granted the FTC is very similar in
scope to that given the NLRB by § 11. See STAFF OF SENATE Comm. ON ED. & LABOR,
74TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COMPARISON OF S. 2929 AND S. 1958, at 40 (Comm. Print
1935), reproduced in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT
OF 1935, at 1319, 1367 (1949).
16338 U.S. 632 (1950). In this case, the F.T.C. had ordered Morton Salt Co.
and others to cease and desist from certain trade practices. The corporations followed
the order and reports of compliance were filed and accepted. Subsequently the Commission ordered the corporations to file special reports to show continuing compliance
with the decree. The Court stated that "[e]ven if one were to regard the request for
information in this case as caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless
law enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate
behavior is consistent with law and the public interest." Id. at 652.
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was willing to reject objections based on the fourth and fifth amendments and enforced the Federal Trade Commission's request for documents even though it was such a "fishing expedition."
The broad power of administrative agencies to investigate does
not imply, however, an unlimited power to compel the production of
any and all information. The purpose of an investigation must be to
enable the investigating party to decide some question properly before
it. Information demanded by
subpoena must be sought for the purpose
17
of answering that question.

In its memoranda before the district courts, the Board states that:
The representation proceeding conducted pursuant to Section
9 of the Act . . . is clearly an "investigation" within the

meaning of Section 11.'1
It then goes on to argue that the Excelsior list, by insuring a more
informed and reasoned choice, is relevant to the final outcome of that
investigation.
In support of this proposition the Board cites four
19
cases.

None of the four is persuasive, and only two are even relevant.20
Inland Empire District Council v. Millis2 ' does say clearly that the
17 See id.: Information must be supplied "if the inquiry is within the authority of
the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably
relevant." (emphasis added). Cf. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S.1 8186, 209 (1946) ; Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943).
E.g., Memorandum for Plaintiff at 4 n.2, NLRB v. British Auto Parts, Inc.,
266 F. Supp. 368 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Memorandum for Plaintiff at 4 n.2, NLRB v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 54 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 11,659 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 13, 1967);
Memorandum for Plaintiff at 4 n.2, NLRB v. Wolverine Indus. Div., 54 CCH Lab.
Cas. 1 11,658 (E.D. Mich. 1966). The footnote is identical in each of the memoranda
above and, since it has gone unchallenged, is probably standard form for all memoranda
prepared by the General Counsel.
19 Lewis v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 10 (1958); Inland Empire Dist. Council v. Millis,
325 U.S. 697 (1945); NLRB v. Duval Jewelry Co., 243 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1957),
aff'd, 357 U.S. 1 (1958) ; Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. NLRB, 209 F.2d 782 (7th Cir.
1953).
20 The others are easily dismissed. In NLRB v. Lewis, 357 U.S. 10 (1958), the
question whether an investigation was being conducted by the Board in a representation proceeding was not presented. Instead, Lewis dealt with subpoenas issued during
a § 8 [29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964)] unfair labor practice investigation. Thus the case lends
no support to the Board's argument-that the Excelsior list can be subpoenaed because
the entire representation proceeding under § 9(c), 29 U.S.C. 159(c) (1964), is an
investigation-since that section was simply not involved in the Lewis case.
In the other case cited, Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. NLRB, 209 F.2d 782 (7th Cir.
1953), the Seventh Circuit held that information used by the Board to decide whether
to hold a hearing on the question of representation was not part of the "record in the
proceeding." Under § 9(d) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(d) (1964), the record of an
investigation made pursuant to § 9(c) is to be included in the transcript of the entire
record required to be filed when a court reviews a Board order in an unfair labor
practice proceeding. The employer argued that "each step taken under 9(c) . . .
[was] part of the investigation" and, therefore, information relied upon by the Board
in making its decision whether to hold a hearing was part of the record. Id. at 786.
The court's decision, rejecting the employer's argument, lends no authority to the
proposition advanced by the Board in cases involving subpena of the Excelsior lists.
Since the court decided that the only record the Board had to make was a transcript
of the hearing on the question of representation, it is implicit that this is the only step
under § 9(c) that the court considered an "investigation." Whether the Board was
conducting an investigation after it determined that such a question existed-a point
crucial to the Board's argument here-was in no way involved in the case.
21325 U.S. 697 (1945).
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entire representation proceeding, up to certification of (or refusal to
certify) the union as bargaining representative, is an "investigation." 2
But Inland Empire, decided in 1945, was interpreting section 9(c)
Under that section, the Board had
of the original Wagner Act.'
discretion to "take a secret ballot of the employees, or utilize any other
suitable method to ascertain such representatives." ' As the Court
noted, this section allowed the Board to use the results of the election
as evidence tending to show employee desires. 5 But the Board was
not bound by the election results, and could disregard them if it so
chose; it was to ascertain the proper bargaining representatives by
whatever method it found suitable.26 The ultimate fact of representation was a question for the Board to determine. Therefore, the entire
proceeding up to certification was properly deemed an "investigation."
The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, however, amended section 9(c)
to make an election mandatory once a question of representation was
found to exist.Y7 As the House Minority Report pointed out, the
Board's function was merely to determine whether such a question
existed; if it did, the election was to be held and the results certified.2
The Board's "investigation" therefore ends upon its determination that
a question of representation exists, and the Board's reliance on Inland
Empire is misplaced.
NLRB v. Duval Jewelry Co., also relied on by the Board, cannot be distinguished on the same grounds: it was decided in 1958.
There, the Court upheld the Board's power to subpoena evidence during
a representation proceeding. But the Court's reasoning is consistent
with the argument just made, for the subpoena in Duval was issued
pursuant to an investigation whether a question of representation
existed." Until that question has been decided, an "investigation" is
admittedly in progress; the Excelsior list cases, however, all involve
information demanded after that question has been decided (affirmatively) and an election ordered. Duval does not speak to this issue.
As an alternative to the above, it might be argued that the information is relevant to the Board's investigation of eligibility. In a representation proceeding the Board must determine the appropriate bargaining unit 3' and whether a question of representation exists." As a
necessary corollary to these questions, the Board must also determine
22 See id. at 707.
23 Act of July 5,
2

1935, ch. 372, § 9(c), 49 Stat. 453.

4 Id. (emphasis added).
25 325 U.S. at 707.
2

6 Id.
Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, § 9(c), 61 Stat. 144.
28 See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1948) (minority report), reproduced in 1 LEGisLATivE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr OF 1947
377 (1948).
29 357 U.S. 1 (1958), aff'g 243 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1957).
27

30 See id. at 2-4.
31 NLRA § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964).
32 NLRA

§ 9(c), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964).
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which employees are eligible to vote. Prior to Excelsior an employer,
shortly before the election, was required to supply the Board with a list
of names of the employees claimed by him to be eligible to vote.33 In
Excelsior the Board, in addition to holding that the list was necessary
for an informed electorate, reasoned that its new rule-by making both
the names and addresses available early in the election proceeding-3 4
would further aid the union in ascertaining the eligibility of voters.
The Board did not claim that the list would be helpful for its own use
in determining eligibility. Rather, it was thought that the availability
of the list would reduce the number of eligibility challenges the union
would otherwise make and thereby reduce the number of Board
investigations into the merits of such challenges. Under this reasoning,
the Board would not demand the names and addresses for its own use,
but would seek to act "as a mere conduit for the union." "
Nowhere do Sections 11(1) and 11(2) of the Act authorize
the Board to use its investigatory and subpoena powers for
the sole purpose of transmitting information to certain parties.
. . . The plain language of Section 11 (1) of the Act would
appear to indicate that there must be some independent use
made by the Board itself of evidence obtained pursuant to its
investigatory powers.
No case can be found where a subpoena was used for the sole
purpose of transferring information to another party; the cases upholding the Excelsior list are decided on other grounds. Although the list
of names which the employer was required to supply under the rule
before Excelsior was available to the union for its use in making
challenges, this list was nevertheless subpoenaed for the Board's own
use in determining eligibility. 7
Even if the Excelsior list could properly be subpoenaed merely to
aid the union in making challenges, however, that fact should not be
determinative in the present cases. The Board could properly subpoena
the Excelsior list for a number of purposes-to make independent use
of it in determining eligibility, to conduct an election by mail,' or
perhaps even to determine the appropriate bargaining unit and whether
a question of representation exists. But it is clear that the list of
names and addresses is not being subpoenaed here to aid in the determination of eligibility or of any other question. The Board is subpoenaing the lists to ensure equal communication of the election issues.
33

See NLRB v. Friedman, 352 F.2d 545 (3d Cir. 1965).

34 Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1242-43 (1966).

3 NLRB v. Q-T Shoe Mfg. Co., 279 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.N.J. 1968).
3

6Id. at 6-7.
37See Cudahy Packing Co. v. NLRB, 117 F.2d 692 (10th Cir. 1941).
38

See NLRB v. Groendyke Trans., Inc., 372 F.2d 137, 141-42 (10th Cir. 1967).
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The opinion in Excelsior must be read in the context of the history
which led up to it. Excelsior is the latest in a series of cases which
attempt to deal with the problem of inequality of communication in
election proceedings. 9 Aiding the union in handling challenges was
not the reason for the rule, but merely an additional advantage which
might be effected by it. The purpose of the Excelsior rule, and the
purpose of the Board here in requesting the lists, is not to determine
eligibility, but to insure that the final question of representation is
determined "under conditions designed to promote a 'free and reasoned'
employee choice." 40
In NLRB v. Hanes Hosiery Division,4' the Fourth Circuit, in
reversing the district court and granting enforcement of the Board's
subpoena, stated:
The information sought by the Director in this case was in
our judgment "evidence" of a "matter under investigation
or in question" as contemplated by Section 11 of the Act,
29 U.S.C. § 161. One of the powers vested in the Board was
the certification of employee representatives

.

.

.

.

The

union's petition for the election invoked this power and engendered, as a reasonable incident, inquiry of who were the
prospective balloters and the most advisable means of achieving a just understanding expression of their preference.42
The court's reasoning is specious. The list of names and addresses
was not subpoenaed to aid in the inquiry of who were the prospective
balloters 3 Nor was it subpoenaed to aid in the inquiry of the most
advisable means of achieving a just and understanding expression.
That inquiry had already been held and a determination made in the
Excelsior case itself. There the Board declared that union access to
the names and addresses of employees was necessary to a fair and
reasoned employee choice. The Board now seeks to subpoena these
names and addresses not to discover the most advisable means of
achieving a just and understanding expression, but rather to enforce
what they have already decided is the best means for achieving such an
expression.
39 See, e.g., NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America, 357 U.S. 357 (1958);
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); NLRB v. S&1- Grossinger's, Inc., 372 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.
1967); General Elec. Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1247 (1966); May Dep't Stores Co., 136
N.L.R.B. 797 (1962); Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953); Peerless
Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953). See generally, Comment, 80 HARv. L. Rxv.
459 (1966).
4
o Brief for Appellee at 46, NLRB v. Rohlen, 385 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1967).
41 384 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 950 (1968).
42384 F.2d at 191.
43 In Hanes the employer even offered the list of names and addresses for the
Board's own use in determining eligibility. Id.
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In sum, as the courts have properly recognized, Congress intended
the National Labor Relations Board to have a broad subpoena power.
But this broad subpoena power is for the purpose of investigation,
not as a means of enforcing Board policy and regulating conduct. The
Board may not use an investigation as a guise for enforcing its policy:
[I] t was certainly not the intention of Congress under Section
11 (2) to confer jurisdiction upon federal courts for the disguised purpose of enforcing the Board's rules of decision.'
The Granting of an Injunction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1337
As an alternative to its request for subpoena enforcement, the
Board has asked the district courts for a mandatory injunction under
section 1337 of the Judicial Code. This section confers upon the
district courts "jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising
under any Act of Congress regulating commerce .... 45
On its face, section 1337 would seem to sustain jurisdiction in
the district courts. But the section is not to be read so broadly.46 The
National Labor Relations Act has set up complex procedures for
review 47 of Board orders." Normally, these procedures are not to
be circumvented by resort to the federal courts except as provided by
the Act. 49 The Board has argued here that an injunction is necessary
to effectuate its statutory power to control the conduct of elections.50
But this is by no means clear. If an employer's refusal to abide by
the Excelsior rule amounts to an unfair labor practice, the obvious
intent of the Act is that the normal procedures for restraining such
',

44NLRB v. Q-T Shoe Mfg. Co., 279 F. Supp 1 (D. N.J. 1968).
45 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1964):
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or
proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies.
46
See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Samoff, 365 F.2d 625, 627 (3d Cir.
1966) ; cf. Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 480 (1964). But see Capitol Serv.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501, 504 (1954).
47
Arguably, the suit is "not one to 'review,' in the sense of that term as used in
the Act, a decision of the Board . . . ." since the Board is instituting the action,
and therefore comes within the principle of Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188 (1958),
from which the above language is taken. This, however, turns the case on its head.
In Leedom, review was allowed out of the normal sequence "to strike down an order
of the Board made in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the Act." Id. Not surprisingly, the Board has made no such claim here.
4sSee generally Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 191-201 (1958) (Brennan &
Frankfurter, JJ., dissenting).
49 Twice, each case "characterized by extraordinary circumstances," Boire v.
Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 479 (1964), the Supreme Court has permitted district
court review of orders in certification proceedings. The two cases are McCulloch v.
Sociedad Nacional, 372 U.S. 10 (1963) (international ramifications) and Leedom v.
Kyne, 358 U.S. (1958) (discussed in note 47 supra).
SO The memoranda in the district courts are virtually identical.
Probably the besttyped is Memorandum in Support of Complaint for Order Compelling Production of
Records at 11-14, NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 54 CCH Lab. Cas. 11,659
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 13, 1967).
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practices be followed. On the other hand, if the refusal to provide the
lists does not amount to an unfair labor practice, it is questionable
whether the Board is entitled to enforce compliance at all. 5
For a number of reasons, the Board has sought to avoid determining whether noncompliance with the Excelsior rule is an unfair
labor practice.5" By so doing the Board has attempted to circumvent
the statute. If the requested subpoenas were enforced or the injunctions issued, the NLRB not only would be able to enforce its
election rule exactly as if noncompliance were an unfair labor practice,
but also would be able to avoid determining if such noncompliance is
indeed an unfair labor practice. Thus, if successful, the Board would
be able to bypass all the requirements and time involved in finding
conduct an unfair labor practice by merely setting an election rule and
then enforcing it in the district court through an injunction. 53
This danger is most clearly demonstrated in the very case which
established the Board's power to set standards of conduct and to invalidate an election for the breach of those standards, even though such
a breach might not amount to an unfair labor practice. In General
Shoe Corp.,5 4 the NLRB set aside an election because the employer had
engaged in noncoercive anti-union speeches. Such conduct was protected from being declared an unfair labor practice by section 8(c) of
51 See notes 52-57 infra and accompanying text.
52There is probably one principal reason why the Board has refused to seek enforcement of Excelsior as an unfair labor practice. The Excelsior rule applies to every
election case. Failure to comply with the rule provides a per se ground for setting
aside the election. Even if the Board could find that an employer's refusal to reveal
the names and addresses of his employees was an unfair labor practice in one case, it
is doubtful whether the Board could hold that such noncompliance would be an unfair
labor practice in every case. Whether a presumption exists or not, interference, restraint and coercion are not elements which can be predetermined; they must be sought
in the particular facts of the particular case. See text accompanying notes 56-57 infra.
In some election proceedings, for instance, where the bargaining unit is very small and
the union knows the names and addresses of all the eligible voters, it would be very
difficult to find that the absence of the Excelsior list interfered with the employees'
§ 7 rights. Since noncompliance with the Excelsior rule might not be an unfair labor
practice per se, an employer might violate the rule in the hopes that the particular
circumstances surrounding his action would make his noncompliance legal. The need
in every case to litigate the issue whether the absence of the list did, indeed, interfere with the employees' rights would make enforcement of the rule so unwieldly and
time-consuming as to completely undermine its effectiveness.
It might also be noted that in refusing to supply the Excelsior list, the employer is
guilty only of inaction. There may be some difficulty in stating that a person has
engaged in interference, restraint or coercion, when he has not acted at all. See
Wyman-Gordon Co. v. NLRB, 58 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 12,750 at 21,809 (1st Cir. June 12,
1968) (dissenting opinion by Coffin, C.J.).
53 Enforcing the subpoena or upholding issuance of an injunction in the present
actions would also drastically limit the scope of judicial review. If the court decides
that the subpoena is within the Board's statutory authority, that is, if it is a proper
subpoena under the statute, then the subpoena must be enforced and review of the
Board's decision is precluded. Likewise, if the court decides that an injunction is necessary to effectuate the Board's power to control election conduct, then the injunction
must be issued and the scope of the court's review is finished. Such decisions would
allow the Board to establish a per se rule for judicial enforcement of Excelsior, and
would prevent the courts from making their normal inquiry into whether there was
sufficient evidence that the employer's conduct did, in fact, interfere with or coerce the
employees in the exercise of their § 7 rights.
54 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
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the National Labor Relations Act, which insures employers as well
as unions the right of free speech in an election campaign. 5 If the
Board could promulgate an election rule prohibiting such speech and
could enforce that rule by injunction, it would be able to bring about
exactly the result which section 8(c) was designed to prevent.
The area of employer no-solicitation and no-distribution rules
provides a further illustration of the extent to which granting the
Board's request for an injunction in the present cases would improperly expand the Board's power in other cases. The courts have
held that the question whether the employer's no-solicitation or nodistribution rule constitutes an unfair labor practice is not subject
to any "mechanical answers" but must be answered by balancing the
right of the employer to control his plant against the right of the
employees to organize. For example, in NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America,"6 the Supreme Court held that whether the enforcement of a valid no-solicitation rule by an employer who is at the
same time engaging in anti-union solicitation is an unfair labor practice
cannot be answered by any predetermined test, but rather must be
decided according to the facts of each particular case. However, under
the Hanes Hosiery rationale, this requirement can be easily and effectively avoided. The Board could establish an election rule that the
enforcement of a no-solicitation rule by an employer who is at the same
time engaging in anti-union solicitation would provide a per se ground
for setting aside the election. If an employer refused to obey this
rule, the Board would be entitled to an injunction as necessary to
effectuate its clear power to control election conduct.5" Thus the
Board would be permitted to avoid balancing the respective rights of
§ 158(c) (1964):
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination
thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any provision of [the
NLRA], if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise
of benefit
The General Shoe doctrine itself allows the Board to frustrate the unfair labor
practice requirements of the Act. By overturning an election because of noncoercive
employer speech, the Board is effectively discouraging precisely the kind of conduct
§ 8(c) was designed to protect
65 NLRA § 8(c), 29 U.S.C.

66 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
57As pointed out in the text, granting the injunction in the present cases would
improperly expand the Board's power in other cases. However, this increase in power
would not be as far-reaching if the relief granted the Board were limited to enforcement of the subpoena under NLRA § 11, 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1964). For an expanded
subpoena power to be useful to the Board, there would have to be something to subpoena. Thus, the subpoena would be useless both in preventing the employer from
speaking in the General Shoe situation and in enforcing a rule against no-solicitation
rules.
However, even if granting the requested subpoenas would not greatly expand the
Board's power in other situations, it would greatly expand its power to compel employers to furnish unions with lists of employees. Because a list can be subpoenaed,
the Board could restrain violation of the Excelsior rule just as though its violation were
an unfair labor practice, even though the Board made no finding under the unfair
labor practice sections of the Act.
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employees and employer according to the particular circumstances
merely by avoiding the entire question whether the no-solicitation or
no-distribution rule is an unfair labor practice.
Conclusion
Congress has set up five specific ways in which the NLRB can
come before the federal courts.18 Aside from enforcing a subpoena, the
courts can permanently restrain conduct at the Board's instance where
that conduct is found to "interfere, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 . . . . "
Even
if Congress did intend the Board to have control of election conduct,
it did not intend the Board to have the power to set election rules
enforceable by a district court. Such a result would upset the entire
enforcement procedure of the Act and make unfair labor practice findings unnecessary.
Congress intended that neither "the National
Labor Relations Board [nor] the Courts should be given any blanket
authority to prohibit whatever labor practices . . . in their judgment
are deemed to be unfair." "0 Only if refusal to comply with the
Excelsior rule is found to constitute an unfair labor practice-to interfere with, restrain or coerce the employees' section 7 rights-should
the employer be ordered by a court to submit the list. And such an
order should only come from a circuit court enforcing a Board order.
5
- 8Judicial intervention is authorized by the following sections of the National
Labor Relations Act:
1. NLRA § 10(j), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1964), gives the Board power to petition
a district court for temporary injunctive relief after the issuance of a complaint in an
unfair labor practice proceeding.
2. Where certain specified unfair labor practices are involved, the Board has
limited recourse to the courts even before a complaint has been issued. NLRA
§ 10(1), 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1964).
3. NLRA § 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1964), provides that courts of appeals of
the United States are to be the only forums in which Board orders may be reviewed
as of right.
4. The Board may petition the courts of appeals for enforcement of orders made
in cases involving violations of the unfair labor practice provisions of the Act. NLRA
§ 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1964).
5. Where a legitimate Board investigation is under way, the Board is given the
power to petition courts for orders enforcing its subpenas under NLRA § 11(2),
29 U.S.C. § 161(2) (1964).
Exceptional circumstances, as has already been noted, allow resort to the general
provisions of § 1337. See notes 46-49 supra and accompanying text.

59 See NLRA § 8(a) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1964).
'OS. RF2. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1934).

